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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

BETTY LeSOURD, a woman, ALEX
T. DAVIES and THELMA DAVIES,
his wife, and VALLEY BANK &
TRUST COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
11866

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
All italics are ours and are added for emphasis.
The parties will be referred to as in the Trial Court.
"R" refers to Record and "T. R." refers to Transcript
of Record.
1

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action in eminent domain, brought by
the State of Utah, by and through its Road Commission
to acquire certain land owned by the defendants for
highway purposes. The only issues before the Court
below were the fair market value of the property taken
by the State as of the 12th day of September, 1967,
the damage to the remainder, if any, and the amount
of land owned by defendants and effected by the take.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Civil actions Nos. 3753 and 3736, on file in the
District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, were
consolidated for purposes of trial before the Court,
sitting without a jury. At the conclusion of the trial,
the Court entered judgment in favor of the defendants
and against the plaintiff in the sum of $65,990.00, as
just compensation for the property condemned and
damages to the remainder of defendants' properties.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial, or in the alternative, a l\iiotion for Remittiture, which Motions were
duly argued to the Court and denied. Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal to this Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff asks that the judgment and ruling of the
Lower Court be reversed and a new trial ordered.
2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff filed two actions in the District Court
of Swnmit County, State of Utah, pursuant to the law
of eminent domain in this State for the purpose of
condemning, for highway purposes, defendants' rights
in .48 acre of real property described as Parcel Nos.
28, 28:H, 28:F, and 28:G, as more fully set forth in
the Complaints on file herein.
By stipulation of counsel, the Summons and Complaints were served upon the respective defendants on
September 12, 1967, and as such would constitute the
date of taking and the date upon which all testimony
and evidetnce relative to values would be directed and
predicated (R 79, 80}.
The subject property is located near the intersection of U. S. Highway 40 and Highway U-248, in
Summit County, Utah, commonly known as Kimball's
Junction (TR 620). Prior to, and at 'the date of taking, a business consisting of a garage, service station,
cafe, and small cabins was conducted upon a portion
of the property. The improvements were concentrated
upon approximately 1.33 acres of land adjacent to U. S.
Highway 40 (TR 621, 631), being Parcels 5 and 6,
Ex. P-4. Access was confined to two thir'ty foot openings located on opposite sides of the gasoline pumps
(TR 620).
The defendants Alex Davies and Thelma Davies,
3

wife, purchased their property from Emmett llrooks
in 1952 (TR 70, Ex. P-13). At the commencement
of the trial, defendants asserted that they owned approximately 8 acres of land which comprised the parcel
from which the taking was made and was the parcel
damaged in the condemnation proceedings (TR 56) .
The plaintiff maintained that the defendants did not
own all of the land claimed, and the determination of
just compensation should be limited to that unit or
parcel of land owned by said defendants and effected
by the take (TR 15, 16, 17).
The Trial Court concluded that an issue of title
existed which should be resolved before considering
any evidence relative to damages (TR 52). The evidence of title to the area consisted, in part, of plaintiff's
Exhibits P-4 and P-10, and Abstracts of Title (P-11,
P-12, P-13, P-14, P-15, P-16 and P-17), which were
used extensively in tracing the indicia of title of the
parcels of land directly involved. Exhibit P-4 is a
tracing with several overlays prepared by the witness,
Darwin McGuire, licensed abstractor, who appeared
as a witness in behalf of the plaintiff. The exhibit is
designed to illustra'te the land description in the chain
of title to each tract, and is numbered and colored to
correspond with each Abstract of Title (Ex. P-11
to P-17). Mr. Charles W. Romney, Esq., who is a
licensed abstractor and attorney, searched and examined
the official records of Summit County, State of Utah,
and examined the Abstracts of Title in evidence and
4

testified relative to the title to the various parcels (TR
223, 224, and 225) .
Utilizing the parcels nwnbered on Exhibit P-4,
the testimony of both the abstractor, Darwin McGuire,
and the testimony of Charles W. Romney, Esq., can
be summarized in the following manner:
I. Parcels 1 and 2 are vested in Summit County,

a municipal corporation (TR 223) .

2. Parcel 3 (not involved in this action) is vested
in the American Legion (TR 223) .
3. Parcel 4 was owned by C.H. Stoven and Florence M. Stoven, his wife, and was sold to Summit
County by an Agreement to Sell Real Estate which
appears of record in the office of the County Recorder
of Swnmit County, State of Utah, as Entry No. 49040
(Ex. P-11) (TR 173).
4. Parcels 5, 6 and 7 are vested in Betty LeSourd
(TR 223).
5. Parcel 8, in yellow and the unnwnbered portions in yellow, are vested in the State of Utah (TR
224), (P-4).
6. Parcel 9, in red, belongs to U. S. Highway
Thirty Association (TR 225) .
7. Parcels IOA. IOB, and IOC, colored in light blue,

with the exception of that portion of IOC covered by
red hash m arks, belongs to L. J. Tree (TR 223, 224).
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8. That portion of Parcel IOC, in blue and covered by the red hash marks, belongs to Betty LeSourd
(TR 223).
9. Parcel II, in the dark green, is vested in the
State of Utah (TR 224).
In 1963 the defendants, Alex Davies and Thelma
Davies, his wife, executed a Warranty Deed in favor
of their daughter, Betty LeSourd, pertaining to Parcel
No. 7, shown on Exhibit P-4 and reserved a life estate
unto themselves (TR 188). Thereafter, in March, 1964,
Alex Davies and Thelma Davies, his wife, executed
a Warranty Deed in favor of Betty LeSourd, describing Parcels 5, 6, and 7 as shown on Exhibit P-4 and
reserved life estates therein (TR 188).
In 1965, Alex Davies and Thelma Davies, his
wife, executed two Warranty Deeds in favor of Betty
LeSourd (Ex. D-7, D-8). One deed used the description of Parcel No. 2 of the Bush and Gudgell
Survey (Ex. P-10), and comprised 0.595 acre, which
constitutes a part of Parcels 9 and IO-A, of Ex. P-4
(TR 189). The other deed used the description of
Parcel No. I of the Bush and Gudgell Survey (Ex.
P-10) comprising 7.975 acres, which constitutes Parcels
I, 2. 4, 5, 6, 7, parts of 9, 10-B and 10-C of Ex. P-4
(TR 190).
With respect to the land claimed and in dispute,
the defendants had only paid taxes upon the same for
6

two years immediately preceding the filing of the Condemnation Complaints (R 49, TR 209).
The defendant Thelma Davies testified that the
old county road, which bisects the land claimed by them,
has in fact, been used at times by the public (R 100).
Alex Davies testified that gravel had been removed
from the old road right of way without his consent
(TR 116, 123).
At the conclusion of the hearing on the title issue,
the Court ruled that the defendants had established
their "claim of interest" in and to 6.27 acres of land
to "be considered for the purpose of this taking as
being the property of the defendants" (R 49, 50),
(TR 266, 267). As a consequence of the Court's
ruling, and subject to the objections of plaintiff, all
evidence and testimony relative to the damages were
predicated upon the premise that the taking was from
the 6.27 acres and damage to the remaining parcel by
reason thereof.

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR
IN HOLDING THAT THE PARCEL OF
LAND OWNED BY THE DEFENDANTS,
ALEX T. DA VIES AND THELMA DA VIES,
HIS WIFE, AND BETTY LESOURD, EFFECTED BY THE CONDEMNATION CON7

SISTED OF 6.27 ACRES OF LAND.
A. THE COURT ERRED IN ALLO\VING
TESTIMONY OF THE VALUE OF THE PARCEL COMPRISING 6.27 ACRES BEFORE
THE TAKE AND EVIDENCE OF VALUE OF
THE REMAINING PROPERTIES C01"1PRISING 5.85 ACRES.
POINT II
DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF SUCH
AN INTEREST IN THE PARCEL OF LAND
AS WOULD SUPPORT THE AWARD OF
SEVERANCE DAMAGES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR
IN HOLDING THAT THE PARCEL OF LAND
O':VNED BY THE DEFENDANTS, ALEX T.
DA VIES AND THELMA DA VIES, HIS WIFE,
AND BETTY LESOURD, EFFECTED BY
THE CONDEMNATION CONSISTED OF 6.27
ACRES OF LAND.
8

The law is well settled in this State that in order
to acquire title by adverse possession, it is essential
under the provisions of 78-12-11 and 78-12-12 Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, claimants must
show and prove all of the requisite elements set forth.
"78-12-11. \Vhat constitutes adverse possession not under written instrument. - For the
purpose of constituting an adverse possession by
a person claiming title, not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree land is
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in
the following cases only:
1. 'Vhere it has been protected by a substan-

tial inclosure.

2. Where it has been unusually cultivated or
improved.
3. 'Vhere labor or money has been expended
upon dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or
otherwise for the purpose of irrigating such lands
amounting to the sum of $5 per acre."
"78-12-12. - Possession must be continuous,
and taxes paid - In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the provisions of any section of this Code, unless it shall
be shown that the land has been occupied and
claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and that the party, his predecessors and
grantors have paid all taxes which have been
levied and assessed upon such land according to
law."

The cases are legion that unless each of the elements set forth under the aforesaid Code provisions
have been complied with, no valid title can be
9

acquired in properties occupied by claimants. See the
following authorities:
Jenkins vs. lVIorgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P. 2d 871;
Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 72, 276 P. 912;
D. H. Perry Estate vs. Ford, 46 Utah 436, 151
P. 59;
Homeowners Loan Corporation vs. Dudley, 105
Utah 208, 221 P. 2d 160;
Keller vs. Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 133 P. 2d 318;
Smith vs. Nelson, 114 Utah 51, 197 P. 2d 132.
There is no evidence or testimony in the record
which would sustain any claim of any right, title, interest, or estate in and to Parcel No. 3, vested in the
American Legion; Parcel No. 4, owned by C. H. Stoven and his wife Florence M. Stoven subject to a
contract of sale in favor of Summit County; Parcel
No. 9, vested in U. S. Highway Thirty Association;
Parcels lOA, lOB, and that portion of lOC not covered by red hash marks, vested in L. J. Tree, all of
which are shown on plaintiff's Exhibit P-4 and supported by Exhibits P-11 through P-17.
With respect to the portion of land owned by Summit County comprising tracts designated as Parcels
1, 2, and 4 upon plaintiff's Exhibit 4, it is likewise patently clear and well established under the law of this
State that a party cannot, by adverse use or possession,
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perfect or acquire any interest in realty, adverse to the
interest of the sovereign. By virtue of this rule of law
as recognized by this Court, the defendants would, in
no event regardless of the extent and nature of their
use of said land, acquire any interest by adverse use
against Summit County. The undisputed evidence and
testimony is that Summit County acquired the fee title
to the subject property by 'Varranty Deed in statutory
form, without restriction (Ex. P-17) , and was on the
date of the taking vested with the fee simple title of
said land.
In Peterson vs. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 34 P. 2d
697, this Court stated as follows:
"_Moreover, one may not acquire title to any
part of the public domain by enclosing the same
within his fence or by adverse possession. Utah
Copper Company vs. Ekman, 47 Utah 164, 152
P. 178."
In Cassity vs. Castagna, 10 Utah 2d 16, 347
P. 2d 834: "One may not adverse the sovereign.
Lund vs. 'Vilcox, 34 Utah 205, 97 P. 33."
The rule of law is likewise announced in 2 C.J.S.,
Adverse Possession, Section 14 as follows;
"Generally speaking, title to property dedicated or devoted to a public use cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
Title to such property cannot be acquired by
adverse possession as against the public or as
against the State or a political subdivision thereof, such as a county." (See authorities cited
therein.)
11

Under the provisions of 57-1-12 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which replaces former 781-11 U.C.A. 1943, when a Deed of Conveyance has
been executed and delivered in the form prescribed by
said statute it has " * * * the effect of a conveyance
in fee simple to the Grantee, * * * ."
57-1-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953, which is the
former 78-1-11 U.C.A. 1943, sets forth the following
provision:
"A fee simple title is presumed to be intended
to pass by a conveyance of real estate, unless it
appears from the conveyance that a lessor state
was intended."
In the case of White vs. Salt Lake City, 121 Utah
134, 239 P. 2d 210, this Court in considering the
issues, and certain statutes, which we believe are
applicable to the issues raised in this case, there stated:
"But as long as the dedicated street remains
platted as a public thoroughfare, the statutory
provision that the fee is vested in the County
Commission can only be interpreted to mean that
the rights of the county, acting through its Commissioners, are superior to those of the abutting
property owners insofar as the normal use of the
street is concerned. We have clearly changed
by statute the old common law rule insofar as
streets in platted subdivisions are concerned."
" * * * The provisions enumerating the powers
of the County Commissioners clearly indicate
that the legislature did not regard the dedication to the public of the street in a platted subdivision as the surrender of an easement with

12

retention of the fee to the corpus in the abutting
owner the segregated statutory provisions are
reconcilable when construed to mean that the
county or city authoritie.s are vested with the fee
in the streets. Such ownership carries with it
the right to use it for the enumerated purposes
when, in their discretion, it best serves the public
interest. It may be abandoned and, in that case,
the right to the use and control of this roadway
would revert to the abutting owner pursuant to
36-1-7 and common law principles."
Of further significance to the issue are the provisions of Title 36, Chapter 1, Section 3, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, and 36-1-3 U.C.A. 1943 and 27-1-3
U.C.A. 1953 which provide as follows:
"All highways once established must continue

to be highways until abandoned by order of the

Board of County Commissioners of the County
in which they are situated or other competent
authority."
The defendant land owners did not present any
competent evidence or testimony that the Board of
County Commissioners of Summit County, or other
competent authority had enacted in proper statutory
form, or otherwise, any appropriate Resolution or
Ordinance authorizing or directing the abandonment
or vacation of Parcels 1, 2, and 4, Exhibit P-4.
The distinction between a situation where the
municipal authorities have
the unqualified fee
and where a mere easement of use as a public street
or highway has been taken is set forth in 70 A.L.R.

13

at Page 565:
"The rule to the effect that, where the absolute
and unqualified fee in a street is in a municipality, the title remains in the municipality unaffected by the vacation or abandonment of the
street as such, is impliedly supported by Schlanger vs. Schulman (1925) 211 App. Div. 601,
207 N. Y. Supp. 723, and Frank W. Coy Real
Estate vs. Pendleton (1924) 45 R. I. 477, 123
Atl. 562.
Of further significance is the language set forth
and contained in 39 Am. J ur. 2d 518 Section 146,
which reads as follows:
"Where the procedure for the vacation or discontinuance of a highway or street by direct
action of the public authorities is prescribed by
statute, it is necessary to adhere to such procedure in order that the vacation may be effective,
and there can be no estoppel to deny the vacation
or discontinuance of a highway or street in the
absence of substantial compliance with the procedure prescribed by statute. * * * "
In 39 C.J.S. 1073, Section 137 the following additional rule is set forth:
"From the principle stated in the proceeding
section, it regularly follows that when the highway is discontinued or abandoned the land becomes discharged of the servitude, and the absolute title to the land covered by the highway
reserved reverts to the owner of the fee without
any further action of the highway authorities,
except where the fee to the highway has passed
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to the public. The general rule governs even in
cases where a new and different highway is substituted for the one abandoned. * * * ,,
In Stillwater vs. Lovell, (Okla. 1932) 15 P. 2d 12,
the Court said :
"I. 'A municipal corporation has no inherent
power to vacate a street within its limits or any
part thereof. Even when specifically authorized
by the legislature to vacate streets a municipal
corporation cannot lawfully vacate a public
street or highway for the benefit of a private
individual. A street or highway cannot be vacated
unless it is for the benefit of the public that such
action should be taken."

"2. 'If the public interest is not the motive
which prompts the vacation of a street whether
partial or entire the act of vacation is an abuse
of power and especially is it a gross abuse of
power if it is authorized without reference to the
rights of the public and merely that the convenience
,, of a private individual may be subserve d .
Defendants failed to present any evidence of any
document in writing which would support their claim
of title as required under the provisions of Title 25,
Chapter 5, Section 1, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
(Statute of Frauds), which would support their claim
of title to the land with the exception of Parcels 5, 6,
and 7, Exhibit P-4.
The Trial Court determined that in view of the
deed issued by Summit County to the Utah State Road
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Commission, two portions of land, originally claimed
by the defendants, were owned by the Utah State Road
Commission and would not, therefore, be considered
as property of the defendants in the issue of determining just compensation (TR 266, 267). Of necessity and to justify such a ruling, the Court had to
conclude that Summit County had a valid right and
interest in the property in order to convey to the
plaintiff an interest paramount to that of the defendants.
How then can the Trial Court conclude that the remaining land standing in the name of the County is
now vested or "owned" by the defendants? It is our
position that the authorities cited hereinabove, applied
to the testimony and evidence adduced at the trial conclusively demonstrates that the Trial Court erred in
its ruling on the issue of title. The ownership of the
other tracts involved likewise cannot be sustained by
the defendants on the basis of the evidence and testimony presented, as nowhere in the transcript does there
appear any competent evidence or testimony which
would support the title asserted by the defendants
and which, we believe, would at best constitute a mere
possessory interest without any other indicia of ownership.
POINT I (A)
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING TESTIMONY OF THE VALUE OF THE PARCEL
COMPRISING 6.27 ACRES BEFORE THE

16

TAKE AND EVIDENCE OF VALUE OF THE
REMAINING PROPERTIES COMPRISING
5.85 ACRES.
Subsection ( 2), Title 78, Chapter 34, Section 10
Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides:

" * * * (2) If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel,
the damages which will accrue to the portion
not sought to be condemned by reason of its
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the improvement
in the manner proposed by the plaintiff."
There can be no doubt that under certain circumstances compensation for the taking by right of eminent domain of a parcel or parcels of land may include
recovery for injury to the remaining portion of the
land caused from its separation from the condemned
part where the parcels have been used as a single
economic unit for a common purpose. However, in
order to allow such severance damage plaintiff contends that there must be a unity of ownership between
the part taken and the remaining property. The unity
of ownership must of necessity involve something more
than a "squattor's right' 'or a bare assertion of
ship without any competent indicia of title. Of significance on this point we refer the Court to the case
of Mcintyre vs. Board of County Commissioners, 168
Kan. 115, 211 P.2d 59. In that action, eminent domain
proceedings were commenced to establish a road across

17

a portion of two adjoining separate tracts of land owned
separately by a husband and his wife. Although the
two tracts had been used jointly as a single unit for
the operation of a farm, the Court rejected the theory
that the husband was entitled to damages for the depreciation of the value of his tract on account of the
taking of the tract belonging to his wife, there announcing the following rule:
"The pieces of land alleged to be a single tract
must be owned by the same party, and one owner
is not entitled to recover compensation for land
taken from him because of alleged damage resulting to that portion of land remaining on
account of the taking of land belonging to him.
Even though, as under the facts of this case,
the two tracts have been farmed and operated
as one unit."
In Williamstown vs: Wallace, ( 1958 Ky.) 316,
S. W. 2d 373, the Court, relying upon the rule that
"there must be identical ownership where incidental
damage to a parcel of land other than that over which
a right-of-way is condemned was claimed," held:

" * * * Where a portion of a tract of land
owned by a husband was condemned for the construction of a city reservoir, thereby separating
the remaining portion of the tract from an adjoining tract which was operated by him as a
unit, but was owned by his wife, and on which
were located the family residence and other improvements, the husband was not entitled to
damages for severance and the resulting inconvenience by the taking of a portion of his own
property."
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In Rath vs. Sanitary District of Landcaster County
(1953) 156 Neb. 444, 56 N.W. 2d 741, a question arose
as to whether or not several separate tracts constituted
one contiguous unit thereby entitling the owner to
claim severance damages. In addressing itself to the
issue, the Court
forth the following rule:
"One contiguous tract or unit is that which in
general belongs to the same proprietor as that
taken, and is continuous with it and used together for a common purpose, whether or not
the same is separated by platted or existing lines,
lots, blocks, streets, alleys, or like divisions."
In the case of County of San Benito vs. Copper
Company of California, et al (Calif.
Mountain
1935) 45 P. 2d 428, Appellants were claiming severance damages to certain mining claims which were
located in the vicinty of the land sought to be condemned, contending that it was essential to the operation of their mines that they have the use of certain
water that originated and flowed over the land which
was sought to be condemned. There was no showing
that the Appellant was the owner of or had any right
to acquire or use the water claimed. The property for
which severance damages was claimed was owned by
other than the one whose land was sought to be condemned. In rejecting the Appellant's contention that
they were entitled to severance damages the Court
stated:
"Appellants cite no authorities to the effect
that severance damages may be awarded to one
who is not the owner of the land sought to be
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condemned, and we have found none that uphold
this doctrine." (Emphasis added).

In the case of State vs. Superior Court of Spokane County, et al. (Wash. 1941) 116 P. 2d 752, a
fact situation was presented which is somewhat analogous to the instant case. In that action suit was instituted to condemn a right-of-way over a parcel of land
standing in the name of a single individual which tract
had been used in conj unction with two adjoining tracts ,
and operated as a single unit. However, the title to
the two adjoining tracts were in the names of two other
parties. The Court in rejecting the claim of consequestial damages of the two parties owning the adjacent
tracts said:

I

1

"The fact that the three tracts were used as
one farm, inasmuch as the ownership is divided,
does not entitle the owners of adjacent tracts
to damages. If Harry A. Morrison has, in addition to his ownership of Tract A, an interest,
short of actual owners.hip, in Tracts B and C
owned by the Realtors, and, vice versa, if Realtors, owners of Tracts B and C have an interest
in Tract A to which Harry A. Morrison has
title, that would not entitle Realtors to recovery
of damages to any tract except that one over
which the private way of necessity was condemned, which in the case at bar is over the tract
owned by Harry A. Morrison."
"Tracts held by different titles vested in different persons cannot be considered as a whole
where it. is claimed that one is incidentally injured by the taking of the other for a public
use. This is the rule, although the owner of the
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tract taken holds an interest in the property
clairned to be dama,qed, and although the two
tracts are used as one."
"The damages for taking a right-of-way are
based on ownership of land actually taken and
are limited to lands held under the same title."
(Emphasis added.)
The general rule of law relative to the issue raised
on this appeal is also set forth and contained in 18 Am.
J ur., Eminent Domain, Section 271, at Page 912:
"Tracts held by different titles vested in different persons cannot be considered as a whole
where it is claimed that one is incidentally injured by the taking of the other for a public
use. This is the rule, although the owner of the
tract taken holds an interest in the property
claimed to be damaged, and although the two
tracts are used as one."
A case in point adopting the foregoing rule is that
of Mcintyre vs. Board of County Commissioners, supra,
wherein the Court announced and set forth the following rule:
"The theory of compensation in eminent domain cases is that the owner is to be compensated
fully for all land taken from him, including the
dimunition in value of that remaining owned
by him, but full compensation does not include
dimunition in the value of the remainder caused
by the acquisition of adjoining lands of others
for the same undertaking." (Emphasis added).
It has likewise been held in the case of Jonas vs.
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State, 19 Wis. 2d 638, 121 N.W. 2d 235, that two
distinct parcels of land may not be treated as held un4er
a unity of ownership for the purpose of considering
the taking of one parcel, a partial taking of the combined whole, obligating the condemnor to pay severance.
damages in addition to the value of the parcel taken,
where one parcel is owned by a corporation and the
other parcel by the creators of the corporation, especially where some of the corporate stock is owned by
third persons.
In City of Walla Walla vs. Dement Brothers Company, 67 Wash. 186, 121 Pac. 63, a suit was filed to
condemn certain water rights of the Appellant, and
an issue arose with respect to the ownership of the
water rights, and the Court there addressing itself to
the question of ownership of the rights condemned stated
as follows:
'A party seeking to condemn property as
against a defendant is not bound to admit the
nature or extent of the title of the defendant
in such property, but may at the trial prove the
nature and extent of such title or interest."
All testimony and evidence was presented on the
basis of the ownership as established by the Court's
ruling. Clearly the foregoing authorities do not support
the same, and we believe error was committed.
POINT II
DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF SUCH
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AN INTEREST IN THE PARCEL 01!-. LAND
AS WOULD SUPPORT THE AWARD OF
SEVERANCE DAMAGES.
There is no dispute that this case involves the
question of damages to a remaining parcel of land. The
plaintiff in its Complaint set out the land being taken
by description and then alleged that it was taken from
a larger parcel of land as required by Subsection ( 2)
of 78-34-10, U.C.A. 1953, Supra. The plaintiff is not
required to define the larger parcel of land which may
or may not be damaged by the taking of the part for
the highway enlargement. The rule is stated in 6
Nichols Eminent Domain, (3rd Ed.) 185, Section
26.112:

"\Vhen, as usually happens, only part of a
particular parcel of land is sought to be taken,
it is not necessary to describe the entire parcel,
but only that part of which is required for public
use. Neither is it necessary to describe property
which will be damaged if the proposed improvement is constructed."
The Court has concluded that Subsection 2, supra,
governs the question of severance damages. Board of
Education of Logan City Sch. Dist. vs. Croft, 13 Utah
2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697. The method of determining
severance damages has been stated by this Court:
"The cardinal and well-recognized rule as to
the measure of damages to property not actually
taken but affected by condemnation is the difference in market value of the property before and
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after the taking." Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary Dist. v. Toone, I I Utah 2d 232,
357, P. 2d 486, and 488.
"The difference in value of the remaining tract
before and after the taking" Utah Commission vs
Hansen, I4 Utah 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 9I7, 9I8, and
further "the difference between the fair market value
before and after the taking." State Road Commisston
v. Williams, 22 Utah 2d 30I, 452 P. 2d 548, 550.
In condemnation actions the plaintiff has the
burden of proof of public use and the necessity of
taking, which is not contested here, then the burden
shifts to the landowner to prove the amount of compensation to which he is entitled. In State vs. Howes,
20 Utah 2d 246, 436 P. 2d 803, this Court held in
regards to severance damages:

" * * * In this respect, we are in agreement
with the general proposition that, in a condemnation action, before a landowner may introduce
evidence relating to the amount of severance
damage he must first meet the burden of proving
that he is entitled to that kind of damage. * * * "
In State Road Commission vs. Utah Sugar Company, 22 Utah 2d 77, 448 P. 2d 90I, this Court held:
"Our own authoritites, clearly or by analogy,
substantiate the basic rule set out in Nichols,
supra, and the concept that to justify severance
damages, the damage must be done to the land
itself,-not to that on top of the land which is
not a part of the realty, or what is done on top
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of the land, such as patrolling canals, as is the
case here."
This Court having adopted the before and after
test has recognized the concept of the requirement of
unity of use of land in order to include other land.
"The State quite properly does not challenge
the principle that an award of severance damages
to the remaining property is appropriate where
there are two or more parcels of land, although
not contiguous, are used as constituent parts of
a single economic unit." State Road Commission
vs. 'Villiams, 22 Utah 2d 301, 452 P.2d 548,
549.
This Court also recognized that there may be two
estates in one parcel of land, but that the land is to
be valued as a whole and then the separate estates
be deducted from the value of the whole. Ogden City
vs. Stephens, 21 Utah 2d 336, 445 P. 2d 703.
The Court in State vs. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 3, 286
P. 2d 785, in a case where an adjoining owner sought
to intervene and claiming to have an interest by virtue
of an oral contract stated:
"'Ve believe and hold that to graft charges
onto and create interests in real property, which
is the subject of condemnation, there must be
clear and convincin,q evidence establishing such
charge or interest, and that the evidence in this
case falls far short of that quality or proof, as
the Trial Court concluded." (Emphasis added).
A good discussion of the reason for the rule of
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unity of use and unity of ownership is contained in the
landmark case of United States vs. Honolulu Plantation Co. (9th Cir. 1950) 182 Fed. 2d 172. See also
Ketchum Coal Co. vs. District Court of Carbon County,
· 48 Utah 342, 159 Pac. 737.
The above cases and statute establish that there
must be a larger parcel of land having a unity of use
and of ownership. The ownership of Parcels 5, 6 and
7, Exhibit P-4 is conceded to be in the defendants
Davies and Le Sourd. While plaintiff concedes the
ownership of the above parcels of land, it does not
admit that the parcels have been used in a manner to
satisfy the requirement of unity of use of all of the
parcels as one unit. Parcel 7 was separated from the
other two parcels and was lying idle at the time of the
taking, and there is a lack of testimony that the taking
of the land from Parcel 5 and 6 adversely affected
the value of Parcel 7. The testimony at the compen·
sation phase of the trial fails to establish the unity
requirement of use of this property as part of an eco·
nomic unit and as a part of the commercial establish·
ment. (TR 383, 384, 502, 503, 575, 576, 631).
The defendants, Davies and LeSourd, failed to
establish ownership to the balance of the land included
in the 6.27 acre unit, upon which testimony was admitted at the compensation trial. The allowance of
severage damages is to compensate for the decrease
in the fair market value that the remaining land could
be sold for on the open market. If a claimant does not
26
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own a part of the land in the unit, then he has nothing
which can be sold on the open market, and hence cannot
sustain any damages to something he does not own.
The defendants, Davies and LeSourd, have failed to
establish ownership of the land in the 6.27 acre unit,
except Parcel 5, 6 and 7, Exhibit P-4, and have failed
to meet the required burden of proof
they are entitled to severance damages to the land not owned and
are thus not entitled to offer evidence of severance
damages except as to parcels 5 and 6, Exhibit P-4.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the following facts may be conceded:
I. Defendants were, on the date of taking, the
owners of l.33 acres of land, being Parcels 5 and 6,

Exhibit P-4.
2 .. 37 acre of said Parcels 5 and 6 were taken in
fee for highway purposes (Parcels 28 and 28 :H).

3. The improvements were constructed upon said
Parcels 5 and 6, Exhibit P-5, P-4.

4. Defendants were the owners of Parcel 7 as
shown upon Exhibit P-4.
To conclude that the defendants were the owners
of 6.27 acres effected and involved in the take, as the
Trial Court did, it was necessary to find that old U.S.
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Highway 30-40, which separated Parcels 5 and 6 from
Parcel 7, Exhibit P-4, no longer
in the Grantee,
Summit County; further, that the record owners of
the remaining parcels in dispute were likewise divested
of ownership in said tracts of land notwithstanding
the evidence and testimony presented of their record ,
ownership in fee simple, and that the defendants were '
the "owners of said properties" within the meaning!
of that term as applied to eminent domain actions.
I

The evidence and testimony
by the de-1,
fendants was void of any substantive or probative proof r
1
of such ownership.

Counsel for defendants has argued that defendants
are entitled to compensation for consequential damage
because plaintiff did not produce claimants who would
assert title to the disputed lands, and further that hav- (
ing named the defendants as owners of the land in
the Complaints, the plaintiff is estopped to raise an
issue of title or challenge the validity of defendants'
asserted title. 'Vith these contentions we disagree and ,
do not believe the same to be supported by the law or I
the evidence. To entitle defendants to consequential
damages to the remaining 5.85 acres, as determined
by the Trial Court, we believe that it was necessary
for them to first show :
1. Unity of title.

2. Unity of use.

Furthermore, as this Court has heretofore an· I
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nounced, the quantum of proof
establish a claim of
ownership must be by clear and convincing evidence,
and in this regard we believe that the defendants have
totally failed with respect to the disputed ownership.
If defendants' title or claim of ownership is to be
sustained, it must rest upon title by adverse possession
with respect to the properties held in individual ownership and upon vacation and/or abandonment with respect to the old U.S. Highway 30-40. Nowhere in the
record of the proceedings do we find the evidence or
testimony sufficient to meet the requirement of the
applicable law favorable to the defendants.

In view of the foregoing, it is our position and
contention that the Trial Court committed error and
that this Honorable Court should reverse the Judgment
and Decision of the Lower Court and order a new trial
of the issues involved in this matter.
Respectively submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney (;.eneral
State of Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
By: Brant H. Wall
Special Assistant Attorney (;.eneral
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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